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Organizational Aspects of System Failure: A Case Study
at the Los Angeles Police Department ,
Joyce Glasser
The Graduate School of Management
University of California at Los Angeles

ABSTRACT
The Pattern Recognition and Information Correlation System
(PATRIC) was an online support system using a criminal database
which promised to fulfill an urgent function for the community of
Southern California. Yet PATRIC was phased out at the Los
Angeles Police Department without ever having become fully operative. The experience raises questions about the ability of bureaucratic service organizations to implement and manage unconventional technology and large scale projects. The evidence suggests
that human and organizational factors, on which a support system's
success or fai lure ultimately depends, were overlooked. The paper
relates the system failure to the organizational environment, and
suggests that consideration of the social factors be integrated into
the process of planning for information systems.

INTRODUCTION

1978; Hall, 1976; Keider, 1974; Leavitt,

Studies over the last two decades have
demonstrated clearly that the majority of
information systems fai I due to organiza-

tional rather than strictly technological
factors. Counter-implementation, rather
than successful implementation, is a prevalent phenomenon (Bardach, 1977; Drake,
1972; Grayson, 1973; Harvey, 1970; Keen,
1981; Kling, 1974, 1978, 1980; Morgan and
Soden, 1973; Schmitt and Kozar, 1978).
Although the organizationally related
causes of system failure are numerous, a
growing number of studies have focused
on two interrelated variables found at the
root of unsuccessful implementations: the
handicapping impact of politically motivated, incompetent or pluralistic decision

making (Argyris, 1971; Bardach, 1977; Keen,
1981; Kling, 1980; Pettigrew, 1973; Schmitt
and Kozar, 1978; Yates, 1977), and the
problem of introducing change into
complex organizations (Ginzberg, March,
\
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1964, 1965; Munson and Hancock, 1977;
Zand, 1975; Zmud and Cox, 1979).
Implementation appears to be particularly
problematic for decision support systems
(Keen and Scott Morton, 1978) in bureaucratic organizations (Bariff and Galbraith,

1978; Hall, 1976; Harvey, 1970; Keen, 1981;
Keider, 1974; Laudon, 1974; Leavitt, 1964;
Munson and Hancock, 1977).
Support

systems differ from transactional, batchmode systems in several critical ways:

their usage is discretionary, they rely on
external as well as internal data, require
man/machine dialogue, and introduce new

tasks into the organization (Ginzberg,

March, 1978; Harvey, 1970; Keen and Scott
Morton, 1978; Leavitt, 1964, 1965; Mclean
and Riesling, 1977).
Bureaucratic organizations find task-altering, technologically induced change di fficult because it tends to rearrange the

power structure--or is perceived to do so
by threatened or opportunistic employees
(Argyris, 1970; Churchman, 1964; Hall, 1976;
Kling, 1974; Kraemer, 1977; Munson and
Hancock, 1977). In turn, these employees

part of the "rational" approach used by
most operations research and EDP staffs
(Kling, 1980), they are easily overlooked.
While revealing these hidden variables is
not in itself a solution, it can be a first

take advantage of the organization's resis-

step toward mitigating their disruptive

tance to change by using their power to

power.

thwart the system (Bardach, 1977). Drawing on Bardach's notion of an "implementation game," Keen (1981) suggests that many
systems fail because of irrational, selfinterested decisions made by bureaucrats
who wish to protect their positions or discredit someone else's. But even if no one
is consciously playing at counterimplementation, success is not guaranteed because
of what Keen (1981) diagnoses as an organi-

zation's natural tendency toward a state of
"social inertia." Evidence of this inertia
can be found in the difficulty organizations
have integrating innovation · into their
social fabrics and static structures (Wolek,
1975). In order for organizations to over-

BACKGROUND AND SYSTEM
DEFINITION

The Pattern Recognition and Information
Correlation System was born out of a real
need for an interactive, central databased
system capable of correlating a large
volume of police-recorded data and detecting patterns of occurrence so that linked

events could be presented to detectives in
With such a
composite form citywide.
'tool, for instance, one detective could go
after one criminal and clear ten crimes
with the same effort. Without a PATRIC

come this state of inertia, an extraordinary

system, it was not unusual to have ten

effort is required of individuals as well as a
firm commitment to the project and to
change in general (Ginzberg, June, 1981;
Wolek, 1975). Frequently, however, inertia
is perpetuated by those who have the
power and duty to reverse it: incompetent
(Morgan and Soden, 1973) or inactive
(Schmitt and Kozar, 1978) management.
'

different detectives trying to solve ten

This paper attempts to illustrate the

dynamics of these issues in the form of a
case study.

The case revolves around a

support system at the Los Angeles Police
Department
(L.A.P.D.)
which
failed
because of socio-political factors inherent
in the organizational environment and the
inability of the L.A.P.D. to accommodate

crimes that were all committed by the
same criminal. The technique is based on
the hypothesis that criminals tend to act in

the same manner during their crimes, use
the same weapons, leave the same evidence and so forth. But crimintils do not
always remain

in the same area, even

though the dectectives who must find them

are limited to ·specific territories--and

information. With PATRIC, once the suspect has been associated with the crime

characteristics, or modi operandi, mention-.
ed above, other crimes could be cleared
with little addit onal field work or cross-

area duplication.

and administer the innovative new systerA.
The case indicates that system developers
do not yet have the vocabulary to deal with

I

The

Los

Angeles

Police

Department

organization. Since these variables cannot

(L.A.P.D.) is divided into eighteen geographical districts called Areas. There is
one Area office in each Area with central
headquarters at the downtown Parker

be easi ly quanti f ied, are vague, and are not

Center.

the hard-to-define "soft" variables (Keen,
1981; Mintzberg, 1977) encountered once the
system is off the drawing boards in a real
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Although a detective can manually correlate historic crime data, the work is time-

detective, the PATRIC analyst would carry
on a dialogue with the computer, increas-

consuming and too I imited in scope to be

ing the queries as more information about
the crime became available, and widening
or narrowing the parameters of the search
depending on the computer's responses.
The detective required fast, online access

effective.

The sophisticated cross-area,

cross-crime correlation that PATRIC provided was beyond the cognitive ability of
any one detective or group of detectives.
If a computerized system could perform

and some help in the analysis of the output.
For this reason, the idea of a support tool
operated by a full-time analyst emerged.

this function more effectively, the deteclive would be free to spend more time in

the field, and the L.A.P.D. would be mak-

The system was envisioned to be similar to
"FAT BOY," the computer personified in
Travanian's bestselling spy novel, SHIBUMI
(Travanian, 1978):

ing more efficient use of its resources.

THE DESIGN OF PATRIC
FAT BOY was a medley of information from all the computers in the
western world...It contained the
most delicate information and the
most mundane. If you lived in the
western world, FAT BOY had
you...He had your blood type, your
political history and birth certifi-

Given this need, and PATRIC's promised
capabilities, it was not difficult to gain
acceptance for the project. The Federal
Government backed the project with a
seven million dollar loan. The incumbent
police chiefs were enthusiastic about the
state-of-the-art system which supported

cates...

the implicit L.A.P.D. policy of automating
police work for better control and lower
costs. A design study team was formed to
translate this advanced concept into a
workable system.

From 1965 through 1974 a design team

developed the "philosophy" of PATRIC and
drew the blueprint for its design and imple-

mentation. The committee was comprised
of members of the L.A.P.D.'s Automated
Information Division (AID), City Hall's
Data Services Bureau, and a local systems

development company. The City Admini-

Although PATRIC was to be more modest
in scope and would, ideally, contain only
criminal data, PATRIC would eventually

incorporate the Field Interview System,
one of the automated systems already in
use at the L.A.P.D. The Field Interview
System was a compliment to PATRIC. It
contained data about "suspicious" people
stopped by patrol officers, but who did not
necessarily have criminal records and were
not associated with a specific crime--yet.

PATRIC databases, on the other hand,

strative Officer (CEO) was responsible for
financial controls. The requirements of

would contain data on crimes that had
already been committed, but lacked a sos-

the system lead the design team to aban-

pect. Once the two systems were merged

don the initial idea of a closed, fully automated system and turn instead to an interactive, open, support system dependent
upon

a

trained

analyst

or

under the umbrella name PATRIC, the

groundwork for an additional correlation
feature would be in place.

operator.

PATRIC would be the first system of this
kind at the L.A.P.D.

OVERLOOKED VARIABLES

This design was dictated by the nature of

the detective's work and problem-solving
procedures.

1

Working with input from the

The design team worked closely with the

police in order to understand their needs

1
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and the nature of their work. Nonetheless,
several important variables were omitted
from the design committee's consideration,
probably because they appeared beyond the

scope of their work, or were too close to
be identified as potential problems. These
variables, which will be revealed in more
detail in the remainder of this case, can be
grouped as follows:

1. The political environment of the
L.A.P.D., especially as it is embedded

in the structure of the organization,

and the crippling effect of decision
making by committee;

2. The inability of the existing data processing structures and processes to
handle the data flow in such a way as to
guarantee its requisite quality;

management.
Political friction arose
because of divergent interests between the
two stakeholder groups within the division.

In the early 1970's, AID was divided into

two sections: Advanced Planning, which
was developing PATRIC, and Management
Services, which was in charge of Data
Entry and the already operative Field
Interview System described above.
According to the grand design for the

L.A.P.D.'s automated network, PATRIC

would eventually incorporate the free
standing Field Interview System.

But by

the time PATRIC was ready for implementation, certain lieutenants and sergeants in the Management Services department had carved an empire they wished to
retain.

PATRIC was seen as a threat to

their domain, and the subtle battle for

control of the data, the analysts, the Field

3. The difficulty and total cost of integrating new components--personnel, tasks,

Interview System and the new system went
on throughout the 1970's. As will be dis-

making provisions for their long term

cussed later, the analyst was a victim of
these "implementation games" (Bardach,

support.

1977).

technology--into the bureaucracy and

4. The importance of training and status
for the new personnel who would not
only be new to the task, but would be

The Data Flow Problem-"Garbage In,
Garbage Out"

the sole "marketers" of the new system.
With respect to the second variable, the
data flow, problems arose because the
human element in the data flow process

Because the designers were constructing a
"rational" system, and because there was,

at that time, no formal methodology in use

was not given enough attention. Although
the software contained many error controls

at Data Services Bureau for evaluating the
system's progress at various stages, these

and data screening routines, the data path

before reaching the CRT's was subject to
human distortion. A brief summary of this

factors were never seen as expl icit varia-

bles to consider in the design and implementation. Yet left unchecked, these variables ultimately had the power to under-

mine

effort.

he long, expensive development

2 Schmitt

and Kozar ( 1978) describe a simi-

lar compounding of errors and omissions as
a "degenerative network of errors...that is

difficult to escape once it is entered."

Power Plays in the Automated
Information Division

Similarly, the full force of the overlooked
PATRIC variables comes from their cumu-

The enthusiasm top management felt for

lative and also their combined effect on

PATRIC was not shared by all middle

the system.
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path suggests there was rych room for
"human error" in the system.
The path began at the scene of the crime
when specially designed forms would be

filled out

the analyst would be looking for a blunt
instrument. A match would not be made,
even though the same criminal was involved.

by police patrol officers.

The L.A.P.D. was not able to ensure the

Although police supervisors, and later the

coordination that would increase the data

analysts, stressed the importance of these
forms, in emergency situations, they often

took

lowest priority.

The forms were

batched at Area offices, then delivered
dai ly

to

Data

consistency and quality. If facts fed into
the computer "FAT BOY" by "an army of

mechanics

and

technicians"

(Travanian,

1979), data was entered into PATRIC by 53

Entry where they were

clerical workers who had no incentives to

logged in, and the forms coded. Narrative
passages on the backs of the forms were

worry about data quality (Glasser, 1980).
Moreover, these workers never met with

dents or modi operandi unnoticed by the

sistency in coding and the need for new

scanned by coders for "code worthy" incipatrol officer. Keyers then entered the
data into the database on CRT's. There

were not enough keyers--and time--to
enter all the data, so data entry was also
selective. At some later date an analyst
many miles away would use this data in her
retrieval searches hoping data stored would
hatch her search and form a pattern.

It

can be seen from this description that the
match,

and

the

success

of

PATRIC,

depended upon the investigative skills of

the patrol officer, the motivation and judg-

ment of the officers and coders, and the

accuracy of the keyers. For example, a
patrol officer might ignore a modi operand'
that, months later, a detective searching
with PATRIC might use as a key crime

characteristic.

The same no-match would

result if a coder could not find an appropriate code for that characteristic. Above
al 1, however, the system depended upon a

high degree of consistency across the
entire L.A.P.D. For example, if it were

reported that a victim was hit over the

head with the end of a rifle, was the proper
code "a blunt instrument" or "a gun?" The
coder might determine it was a gun, while

patrol officers or analysts to discuss con-

codes. Many of the clerks did not even
know what PATRIC was. High turnover

arnong these clerks added to the analyst's
frustration, for even if the analyst were to
call Data Entry on the phone to question a

particular code, there was no guarantee
the same person who entered the codes on

a given day would be there on the day of

the phone call. High turnover and vacancies in the Data Entry unit also resulted in

work backlogs.

Naturally, in a system

designed to track criminals, the timeliness

of the data is crucial, and these backlogs

were thus detrimental to the system's performance . Error rate, which increased
with the turnover and vacancy rate, could

delay the data flow process. The analyst

could be looking for a suspect that should

have been, but was not already, entered
into the system because the system re-

jected the entry. The analyst's conclusions

might be that there was no such suspect
when in fact, there was.

The detective's attitude toward the system
and his confidence of the analyst depended
upon the quality of the data, and hence, on
the factors mentioned above. Since a
support system is evaluated on user atti-

3The mechanics of this process are des-

tudes and voluntary usage (McLean &

"PATRIC at the L.A.P.D.--A Description"
(Glasser, 1980).

bother with PATRIC if it were perceived
as personally beneficial, on a practical

cribed in great detail in my report,

Riesling, 1977), the detective would only
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this would be a problem. Yet the idea of a

Yet the detectives sometimes
level.4
called the printouts from PATRIC "garbage," and their complaints were justified

support system was a novel one at the
L.A.P.D., and the introduction of a specialized civilian operator working in the Area
Offices was also new.

to the extent that the data going in was
also "garbage."

The L.A.P.D. assumed that the existing

The design team envisioned a systern operated by eighteen professionals working

data flow structures and processes would
suffice for PATRIC when the above examples indicate the contrary. The idea of
altering communication channels was not
The analysts'
sufficiently addressed.

closely with the detective unit in each of
the Areas. Anyone familiar with Tra-

attempts to do so, discussed below, met

vanian's novel Shibumi would know that the
operator of "FAT BOY" was a fanatically
devoted "artist" on whom the country's

with disfavor, precisely because they were

greatest detective depended for informa-

attempting to alter the gtructural com-

tion:

ponent ofthe bureaucracy.

,

Programming facts into FAT BOY
was the constant work of an army of

Integrating PATRIC into
the Bureaucracy

mechanics

and

technicians,

but

getting useful information out of
The Analyst

him was a task for an artist, a

Although bureaucracies are, by nature,

inspiration.

person with training, touch and

usually slow to accept change, there is no

What the PATRIC needed was eighteen of

evidence that the design team considered

these "artists" to service the Southern
After years of
California community.

4Frances Wolek ( 1975) supports this notion,

development, negotiations by committee,
and management changes, what PATRIC

carrying it further. Pointing to the need to

received was five clerks in three Area
offices. Two of the five terminals were

integrate systems into the "social fabric"

of the organization, he writes:
"People
don't always do what is best for them. Just
because a new technology is recognized as
beneficial does not mean that it will be

used for "special projects" at the AID

headquarters.

adopted. The user must make a consider-

The disparity between the plan and the

able effort...(and) for this effort to be

made, there must be a solid commitment

reality of the project's resource allocation
is apparently not unusual in complex envi-

PATRIC, of course, there was no such
commitment at all. The struggle was to

study Of ten MIS project failures, Morgan

ronments when a system is being implemented over a long period of time. In a

on the part of the user." In the case of

and Soden (1973) found that most failures

persuade the detective to see the system
as beneficial!

were due to management's inability to plan

55ee Michael J. Ginzberg's ( 1978) interesting discussion of Harold Leavitt's ( 1964)
conceptualization of the organization as a
four-component diamond balancing its

and control. There were several factors
influencing the outcome in PATRIC's case,
including hiring practices, management
changes, inadequate funding, and the in-

ability to raise new funds, and the lack of

communication between the designers and

structure, people, tasks, and technology on
a precarious equilibrium. See also footnote
#9 to this paper.

those responsible for resource al location.
These are summarized below.
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Like many bureaucratic organizations, the
L.A.P.D. has strict pay grade scales and
hiring procedures.
A specific job title

often as it would if the system were completely distributed, for few detectives

would travel out of their way to use an

unfamiliar, discretionary tool.
Even in
those Areas where there was a resident
analyst, many detectives were reluctant to
use PATRIC because they felt threatened
by a computer and "an inexperienced, civil-

corresponds to a predetermined grade

scale. Yet PATRIC required a new type of
employee. Although system designers are
concerned with the personnel implications
of their systems, they are not responsible

for hiring or altering the rigid procedures
in the Personnel Department. Therefore,

ian female" hernming in on their territory.

although the design called for eighteen

Despite this unconducive arrangement, a

analysts, the designers could not create a

few curious officers experimented with

new category of employee just for
PATRIC. According to the protocol of the
bureaucracy, the analyst, as a civilian,
would either be hired in at the Junior

PATRIC. As they were transferred within
the L.A.P.D. to other Areas, they would be
the ones to call in for assistance. In time,
the analysts became accepted not only as

Administrative Assistant level or at the

aids, but socially as well.

clerical level. The former level was more

(The fact that

the analyst position was always filled by a

suitable to the needs of PATRIC because it
required o college degree. However, the
idea of paying eighteen Junior Administrative Assistants to do what the city must

woman may well be responsible in part

both for this initial resistance, and the
later popularity of the analyst). Gradually,
word spread that the system was not a
replacement for the detective, but a

have considered a keypunch job, could not
be pushed through Personnel or the City

potentially valuable tool to serve him. By
this time, however, PATRIC's degenerative

Administrative Office which holds the

purse strings of the L.A.P.D. The project
ended up with five principal clerks.

course had caused officials to begin a
gradual phase out.

Material resources had also been diverted

Costly Compromises in
Software Development

from PATRIC since its inception. Thirteen
of the eighteen CRT's were given over to
other uses. A new captain in charge at the
AID, along with other management
changes, resulted in shifting priorities and
less of a commitment to PATRIC. In
addition, Lyndon Johnson's "Law Enforcement Assistance" grant money that had
helped launch PATRIC, had dried up by the
mid 1970's. In the late 1970's, PATRIC was

Problems in managing a large software
project are by no means unique to the
L.A.P.D. (Hill, 1970). The point to be made
here is that the consequences of a series of
predictable and unforeseeable difficulties
in connection with the software were not
adequately dealt with. By [980, PATRIC's

one of the first projects to receive cut-

phase out was generally acknowledged to

backs due to Proposition 13.

be a result of the increasing difficulty and
high cost of its software maintenance. As

Acceptance of PATRIC was impaired by
these allocation decisions.
Because
PATRIC required a close working relationship between analyst and detective, the
system had to be easi ly available to the
detective and perceived as beneficial on a
daily basis. Without an analyst in each
Area, the system would not be used as

resources were diverted from PATRIC in
terms of personnel, software programming
also suffered a handicapping cutback.
However, the problems with the software
were not the cause of PATRIC's demise.
They were, rather, symptoms of the
organization's inability to manage the
system over time (Hi 1 1, 1970; Morgan and
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A brief background of the

tion's inability to align management goals

software dilemma will serve to illustrate

and decisions 10 be a basic cause of al [
system failure. At the L.A.P.D. the prob-

After completing most of the design work
in 1974, the original vendor lost the con-

degrees of expertise tht each new middle

misuse of funds. IBM won the bid for the

"A new person would come in and think he

Soden, 1973).
this point.

lem

tract with the L.A.P.D. over an alleged
final implementation and proposed using its

National Military Command Information

was

compounded

by

the

manager brought to the job.

varying

PATRIC's

Data Services Project Manager explains.

knew what was going on.

fessioT'

They were pro-

policemen, but amateurs

in

Processing Systems (NIPS) which had been
used at the Pentagon. There were several
problems with this choice. First, NIPS was
a sophisticated and complex system, per-

EDP."

were finally hired, the degree of training
guaranteed, and the level of in-house programmers. Second, this system would have
to be superimposed on the groundwork laid
by the original vendor and substantial
Third, IBM
adaptation was necessary.
would be withdrawing vendor support after
1978.

and Kozar's (1978) "degenerative network
of errors," mentioned earlier. Bardach's
(1977) recipe for successful counter-

Nonetheless, the decision was made to

The decisions, or lack of decisions, regarding the NIPS software adversely affected

haps too advanced for the analysts who

proceed with NIPS. It was available to the
L.A.P.D. for a token amount of money, and

there were few alternatives.

In addition,

Because PATRIC was not formally evaluated with an eye toward correcting poten-

tial problems, it became locked in Schmitt

implementation--rely on inertia, keep the
project hard to coordinate, complex and

vaguely defined, and minimize the implementator's legitimacy and influence--was
apparently easy to follow at the L.A.P.D.

the system and its users. Apparently, NIPS

was constantly in need of repairs which

Data Services Bureau and AID felt confident that by the time IBM withdrew support, its programmers could rewrite the

were beyond the abilities of the twelve
programmers assigned to the L.A.P.D.
Modification and updating of codes as new

entire system so that it could be main-

crime patterns emerged was slow, or could

tained independently and would be better
adapted to the L.A.P.D.'s needs.

not be accommodated at all.

Over the years, however, plans and priorities changed. Data Services Bureau never
worked on rewriting NIPS to guarantee its
longevity. In the words of one data processing employee, "we get our orders from
the L.A.P.D. If they want us to work on

6

If they give us other
PATRIC, we do.
."
those
do
we
projects,

Shifting priorities led to confusion and

waste as plans which one decision maker
approved were later reversed by another,
consciously, or unconsciously. This phenomenon is not unique to the L.A.P.D.
Schmitt and Kozor (1978) cite an organiza-

Schmitt and Kozar (1978) are describing

inter-organizational misalignments rather
than the misalignments resulting from consecutive decisions made at di fferent
periods in time. Evidence here suggests
that both problems were experienced at

the L.A.P.D.
7Also see Schmitt and Kozar ( 1978) for a
brief discussion of the relationship between
poor decision makers and system fai lure,
and Morgan and Soden (1973) for further
discussion of the role of poor management
in system failure.
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The mal functions and lack of adequate
codes were reponsible for much of the
frustration detectives and analysts felt in
dealing with PATRIC. New codes were

visor. However, since many of the new and
inexperienced analysts became frustrated
with their job, turnover was high. With

needed to differentiate one criminal from

each new "generation" of analysts a little

another once a search was narrowed down
to a subtle difference. If modi operandi
could not be expanded to describe new
kinds of crimes and criminals, the system

bit of the original training was lost in the
"hand-me-down," semi-structured learning
process. Before long, in the words of one

analyst,

lost much of its value.

teaching."

direct training from IBM and the super-

"those who didn't

know were

The general effect of malfunctions and
inadequacies in the software was that the
systein would not be used. One data processing employee comments: "If a detective

The issue of training took on a political
tone because of the varying degrees of
competence among analysts. In numerous
instances, one analyst was discouraged

tries the system once and it doesn't work,

from helping a new analyst--even if her

or if an analyst always gets a busy signal,
then next time around they'll be less in-

clined to even try."

help had been solicited. Personal feelings
were also involved. In some cases new
analysts were offended by a senior ana-

Even a considerable

effort on the part of the user (Welek, 1975)
will not guarantee usage if the system is
not supported by the organization's visible

lyst's efforts to correct their way of operating PATRIC and would complain to their

commitment to the project (Ginzberg,

supervisors.

June, 1981).

understood the issues at hand, they would

Since the supervisors seldom

not investigate the issues underlying the
allegations.

Analyst Training and Status in
the Organization

The credibility of the system and its repu-

Training

tation depended upon the quality of the
analysts' work.
Poorly trained analysts

In adopting the NIPS software, the analysts' training became a critical issue. Yet
Data Services Bureau personnel could
never even decide how much of the system
to explain to the analysts.
Too little
knowledge was a dangerous thing with

NIPS, but too much depth might confuse
and frustrate the analyst.

The result was

that the degree of expertise varied greatly
among the individual analysts, depending

on their interest, competence, attitude,

would resort to less effective systems,

such as the Field Interview System, rather

than admit their inability to manipulate

PATRIC. This practice was counterproductive because in many instances the

Field Interview System could not provide
the same information that PATRIC could.
An incorrect search further damaged
PATRIC's credibility and contributed to its
reputation as a very costly system as well.

and on who trained them.

Although training was considered important, an ongoing program was never insti-

tutionalized. The problem began when the
training supervisor quit, reportedly because
of frustrations with the new system and
personal allegiances to the old vendor. The
first group of analysts had the benefit of

An analyst who was not well trained could
easi ly spend thousands of dollars of CPU
time per search by requiring the CPU to

read through all the files rather than
systematically narrowing or widening the
scope of the search depending on the modi
operandi in question.
The system lost
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favor in the eyes of the City Administr#-

Despite their usefulness, the analysts were

tive Office by its poor cost/benefit ratio.

not encouraged to pursue this public relations aspect of their job. According to one
analyst, if she left her terminal in order to

Analyst Status and Job Satisfaction

If the analysts had to contend with inadequote training, their status within the
L.A.P.D. had an even greater effect on

PATRIC's
morale and job satisfaction.
failure or success was directly related to
the analyst's satisfaction with her job since

perform the above mentioned responsibi 1ities, she would often be reprimanded by
her supervisor. Many times the supervisor
would call to "check up" on the analysts'
activities.

dissatisfaction could lead to a reduced

One reason the analysts' responsibilities

level of system usage, which would tilt the
cost/benefit ratio against the system. The
analysts apparently suffered from the lack

visor, was that they had never been ade-

of support from their supervisors and

the Inalysts' Place within the organization
was Jeopardized by the fact that the city's

cdunterimplementation games.

analyst:

Says one

"We were always being bad_

mouthed, and so was PATRIC."

Another

adds, "No one ever listened to us or gave us
credit for knowing what we were doing."
Besides operating the terminal, the original
group of analysts was supposed to visit the
various Area offices to "market" the
system to detectives and also explain to
patrol officers how to fill out their crime
reports for easy and effective transfer into

the databases.

This last task was crucial

because, as has been mentioned, if there

could be altered at the whim of a super-

quately or concretely specified.

In fact,

rigid hiring/pay scale framework did not

provide an accurate job description for the
new analyst. Conventional categories did
not correspond to the type of work the
analyst was originally supposed to do. This
same problem also made it difficult to
properly evaluate an analyst's work, a
serious problem in any system (Keen, 1975).

When the time came to write new job
descriptions so that the analysts' status

could be upgraded, there was no one at the

L.A.P.D. to write a proper justification,

was no consistency between what patrol

one that sounded credible to the City

analyst was to retrieve months later, then

on

the correlation could not be of use to the
detective.

suggested the analyst was a typist, and

officers saw and noted and what the

Administrative Office.
standard

job

The police relied

classifications,

which

were written in police jargon, which meant
little to the City Administrative Office.

The job upgrading was a particularly sore

Bln fact, there was never a real cost/

benefit study for PATRIC. One Captain of
AID assigned that task by the City Administrative Office had to admit that such a

study was impossible. There were never
criteria developed for PATRIC's evaluation, and too many confounding variables
would come into play (Glasser, 1980). Lack
of evaluation criteria put both analyst and
PATRIC in a precarious position. (See also
Keen, 1975 for a discussion of problems in
system evaluation.)

point with one analyst who claims she was

promised a career in computers, growth

potential, and more responsibility if she
transferred to PATRIC, but "none of those
promises were kept."
Lack of job descriptions and evaluation

criteria thus helped make PATRIC an easy
prey to those intent on playing the "implementation game." The system's legitimacy
could never be established on an objective
basis.
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I f the above I ist sounds I ike a conspiracy,

one analyst could not agree more.

related variable:

Far

the personnel who are

pawns in the game of success or fai lure.

from supporting the analysts in their tasks,
one lieutenant at AID reportedly wrote a
letter to the Deputy Chief of Police informing him that the system was not work-

Lawrence Williams from Cornell University
(1981) describes how difficult and politically
sensitive is the task of dealing with personnel issues--new job descriptions, new pay

ing and that it was a waste of time and
money. This was written very early in

scales, evaluation criteria, and so forth--

PATRIC's life cycle, before that accusa-

when a new task or system is introduced in
an organization. These new jobs are hard

tion was a foregone conclusion.

to peg because they do not fit into the

Today

there are no analysts at the
L.A.P.D. The detectives themselves use

conventional levels used by the organization.

CRT's to perform a more basic kind o;
search. The status quo has been restored.
But the inertia, undermining, and misman-

There are no prescriptions for dealing ef-

agement that worked together to reject
the change, have not left the L.A.P.D.

bles of information systems implementation, but to ignore them is to increase the

unchanged.

fectively with the so-called "soft" varia-

If the analysts have been dis-

likelihood of system failure.

A narrow

appointed, the city, too might ·have suf-

perspective will overlook the fact that

fered a loss. In the words of one EDP
employee: "We've regressed. The current
system cannot accomplish what PATRIC
did and could have done."

"technology" is not socially neutral; it, like
other 'actors' in a situation, plays a role in
the social system" (Wolek, 1975).

In arguing the case that more attention
must be paid to the way in which the

introduction of technology alters the for-

CONCLUDING REMARKS

mal and informal social and professional

The interrelationships between the handi-

fabric of the organization, it is interesting

capping effects of pluralistic decision mak-

to turn to a piece of research done by Evan

ing, organizational politics, mismanagement, and the failure of innovation in com-

and Black (1967). They conclude that "staff
specialists are more likely to entertain

plex organizations has just begun to be
explored in the literature of information

technical than administrative proposals.
This in turn, may be related to the reluc-

systems (Keen, 1981). The case of PATRIC
introduces more clear ly than some case
studies the involvement of another closely

tance of business organizations to engage
in administrative innovations."

In the future, perhaps more attention
should be paid to those so-called "administrative innovations" which must be introduced into an organization to restore i ts

'Basing his thesis on Leavitt's ( 1964) con-

ceptualization of the organization, Ginz-

natural equilibrium (Leavitt, 1964; Ginzberg, 19781. Up until now, it has been the

berg ( 1979) attirbutes system failure to the

organization's natural tendency to react to
task-altering innovation by either changing
the remaining components--people, task,
and structure--or undermining the innovation in

order to restore the equilibrium.

Since it is apparently easier to reject than
to accommodate change many technological innovations fail.

informal rnechanisrns of the organization
or the implementation game with its negative goals and side effects that emerge to
restore the equi librium when new components are introduced. What is needed is
a positive, rational, and constructive
method of achieving this balance.
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It is no longer enough to understand the
technology. What is needed is a better
understanding and analysis of the social
milieu in which the system must be incor-

porated to survive. This discussion of the
social aspects of system failure and the
power of the "soft" variables, demonstrates
the need for a wider frame of reference to
be taken by systems developers and the
inclusion of behavioral, psychological,
economic, and political perspectives in
system design.

What is the "power" of these "soft" variables? In the case of PATRIC, hundreds of
thousands of dollars were spent on the

system in an attempt to make it work. At

the same time, the cumulative force of
social and organizational discontent and
incompetence was invisibly working against
it. More important than the money, of

course, is the fact that a potentially valuable crime prevention and control tool was

lost to the community. If an organization

cannot ensure the success of a system,
given its social fabric, existing structures,
financial constraints, and management
capabilities, implementation is often

equivalent to killing the system.

In the

case of innovative new systems, it may

even be better to forego the project altogether than try to launch it in an atmosphere of compromise.
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